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I. INTRODUCTION

The court is saying nonsense. It will never happen that blacks
should fight each other. I will die with my claim to land. My right
to land is a right which cannot be compromised. It is our right. It is
our land. We must be prepared to die for it.
Robert Mugabe, President of Zimbabwe'

As the population on earth continues to rise, many resources (such as
arable land) previously thought inexhaustible are becoming scarce. As
stated by the U.N. Rapporteur, "[n]o question is more central to power
relations within society or to issues of equality and income distribution
than land." 2
Although initially held out as a model of responsible development and
fair governance,3 Zimbabwe stands now on the cusp of mass starvation,
skyrocketing inflation and civil war. Zimbabwe now finds itself forced to
deal with the problems arising from a finite supply of land by balancing
the current rights of owners in their land with a need to feed and provide
resources for the poor. Decades of laws forbidding native Africans from
owning or purchasing land while white farmers continued to invest in and
1. Robert Mugabe, Speech at Gwanda, Gwanda, Zimbabwe, (Jun. 14, 2000).
2. Winston Nagan, Resource Allocation: Land and Human Rights in a New South Africa
7 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (quoting U.N. ESCOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc.
ECN.4/sub.2/1990/19.A+U2 (1990)).
3. See generallySouthern Africa D.O. C.C.,Angola Elected U.N. Security CouncilMember,
at http://www.sadocc.at/news2002/2002-288.shtml (last visited May 13, 2003).
4. See Wairagala Wakabi, Answering Zim's Land Question (out of print document, on file
with author).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol15/iss4/5

2

LAND REFORM
IN ZIMBABWE
Dancaescu:
Land Reform
in Zimbabwe

develop the land has led to a power struggle between the current owners
and the displaced indigenous peoples who believe the land is rightfully
theirs.
This Note examines how a country known as the breadbasket of Africa
could descend into economic chaos in just a few short years by providing
a history of the land issue in Zimbabwe, exploring the role of corruption
and human rights abuses in contributing to the current situation, discussing
the land redistribution issue, and examining the history of development
theory in Africa. Finally, by uniting all these elements, I have attempted
to construct a rough methodology for analyzing the clash between the
rights of the poor to the necessary resources, the rights of a state to
autonomously create and implement social programs, and the rights of
individuals to security in their property.
II. BACKGROUND

From the time Cecil Rhodes ventured north from South Africa with the
British South Africa Company in the 1800s until the independence of
Zimbabwe in 1980, the region was known as Rhodesia in honor of
Rhodes.5 Life under Rhodesian rule was brutal for the blacks in the region;6
many who spoke out against the regime were jailed for years without trial.
One such dissident was Robert Mugabe, a Rhodesian-born, South
African-educated revolutionary who returned to Rhodesia in 1960 to join
the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU).7 Dissatisfied with the
lackluster approach of the ZAPU to ending the apartheid-rule, Mugabe
broke away from ZAPU forming the Zimbabwe Africa Nationalist Union
Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF).8 Mugabe was captured by the Rhodesian
government forces and jailed without trial for ten years and upon release
fled to Mozambique, turning the ZANU-PF into the largest of several rebel
armies fighting the apartheid Rhodesian government. 9 By 1979, Rhodesia

5. See ROBIN PALMER, LAND AND RACIAL DOMINATION INRHODESIA 12-13 (1977). Because
of the decades of oppressive apartheid rules and a land tenure system that forbid native Africans
from owning land, the name Rhodesia has gained a stigma of a time of subjugation. See id.
6. RUTH WEISS, ZIMBABWE AND THE NEW ELITE xx; see also MARTIN MERIDITH, MUGABE:

POWER AND PLUNDER INZIMBABWE 26-33 (2002).
7. See Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe Strongman, BBC NEWS ONLINE, at http://news.bbc.co.
uk/l/hi/world/africa/643737.stm (last visited Apr. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Strongman].
8. See id.
9. Id. Rhodesia declared independence from England in the 1960s after England demanded
they end racial apartheid; as aresult, the U.N. Security Council authorized the use of force to enact
an embargo on Rhodesia, which blockaded in Mozambique harbors, the closest access point to the

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

3

FLORIDA
JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL
Florida Journal of
International
Law,
Vol. 15, Iss.LAW
4 [2003], Art. 5

[Vol. 15

conceded to meet with rebel leaders (including Mugabe) in England to
negotiate the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979 (Lancaster Agreement),
which outlined a plan for the dismantling of Rhodesia, and the birth of
Zimbabwe.'° In the first non-apartheid elections of Zimbabwe, Mugabe
was elected President of Zimbabwe with sixty-three percent of the popular
vote. "
Initially, Zimbabwe stood as a shining example of the new Africa; a
country where self rule and African pride had overcome the hurdles of
colonialism and made an effective political transformation.' 2 But as time
wore on, the unquestioned control of Zimbabwe by Mugabe and his
ZANU-PF Party began to take its toll on the fledgling democracy.' 3 As
many Zimbabweans had feared, Mugabe was unable to make the transition
from the fierce Zimbabwean nationalism and propaganda necessary to
fight a guerilla war to the fair-handed governance necessary to run a
country. "4

sea for landlocked Rhodesia. See MICHAELJ. GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OFPOWER:
INTERVENTION AFTER Kosovo 115 (2001).

10. PETER STIFF, CRY ZIMBABWE 19-20 (2000). During the Lancaster Conference, which was
held between September 10 and December 21, 1979, reports suggest the Rhodesian Government
planned to assassinate Mugabe at the conference, but unexplainably called the operation off at the
last minute. See id.
11. See MERIDITH, supra note 6, at 13. The elections were anything but conventional, with
all sides, including the ZANU-PF largely underestimating Mugabe's chances of winning the
elections. Id. at 11-12. Mugabe was the dark horse candidate who most of the power elite saw as
"something of a Marxist ogre." Id. at 1i. The whites feared that he would institute massive
socialization of all private owned property immediately, and some families even had bags packed
prepared to leave for South Africa on election day. Id. at 13.
12. Id. Mugabe, unlike Samora Machel, the president of neighboring Mozambique, promised
to protect the white minority while trying to help improve living conditions for all Zimbabweans.
See id.
13. See, e.g., id. at 71-72 (quoting Ian Smith). Even Mugabe's former allies, the ZAPU, were
not immune to attacks. See Strongman, supra note 7. Up to 400 members of the ZAPU party were
abducted immediately preceding the 1987 elections. See id.
14. See Nkosinathi Sibanda, Zimbabwe's Land Question: Fascism or National Interest? (Out
of print document, on file with the author). As one South African observer puts it:
A part of Zimbabwe's legacy has been its unrelenting nationalism, which was used
as an ideology by the ruling [ZANU-PF] during the fight for its independence to
rally national rage against the white settlers who then ruled the country called
Rhodesia at the time. After independence Zimbabwe's nationalism assumed the
form of a political tool, and like a club in the hands of Robert Mugabe it has been
used routinely to attack one group after the other.
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A major point of dissension during the Lancaster Conference was the
issue of land reform.'" Under Rhodesian rule, blacks were forbidden from
owning property, and as a result were moved into resettlement areas where
they provided a cheap labor force for the huge white-owned farms.' 6 In
1925, only 14 farms totaling 46,966 acres were owned by Africans, despite
an English law that clearly stipulated "[a] native may acquire ...land on

the same conditions as a person who is not a native."' 17 Even as late as
1969, whites owned 3.6 million hectares of farmland of which only
570,000 were being farmed. 8
Not only did whites own the majority of the lands but the black
Zimbabweans were involuntarily resettled. For the duration of the
Twentieth Century, millions of black Zimbabweans lived significantly
below the poverty line, on infertile land, in ramshackle housing, which
they rarely owned.' 9 Even after liberation in 1980, 700,000 black families
lived on 16.2 million hectares, while 5,500 white farmers had rights to an
almost equal 15.6 million hectares. 20 The problem was clear; the large
majority of black Zimbabweans were unable to eat or be productive
because they had no land to farm, but the white Rhodesians had purchased
and toiled on their land and would not surrender it easily. The land-reform
issue would have to be dealt with, since Mugabe and ZANU-PF had
already made promises to Zimbabweans concerning how many
Zimbabweans would be relocated by certain dates.2'
The Lancaster Agreement provided a ten-year moratorium on any
seizures of property and created a Takings clause in the Zimbabwe
constitution. 22 In order to give ZANU-PF at least some options, the
Lancaster Agreement specifically granted Zimbabwe a right to seize land
if it was underutilized or needed for a public purpose, and only if just
compensation was quickly paid for the seizure.2 3 But the lack of willing
sellers, coupled with the high prices charged for the land, made the
promises of the party look foolish. Year after year, the ZANU-PF party fell

15. See WEISS, supra note 6, at 11.
16. See BRIAN MACGARRY, LAND: FOR WHICH PEOPLE? 5 (1994).

17. PALMER, supra note 5, at 279.
18. See MACGARRY, supra note 16, at 8.
19. See id. at 7. By 1977 the communal areas given over to black Zimbabweans with an
estimated carrying capacity of 275,000 had over 675,000 residents. Id.
20. WEISS, supra note 6, at 191. There are approximately 2.5 acres in a hectare, or 260
hectares in a square mile.
21. See generally N.C.G. MATHEMA, RESETTLEMENT: WHAT IT IS (1996) (for ZANU-PF's
relocation program bulletin); see also MERIDITH, supra note 6, at 120.
22. See Zuvrn. CONST. art. 11 § (c); see also MAcGARRY, supra note 16, at 17.
23. See MERIDITH, supra note 6, at 119.
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further behind their self-created target numbers of resettled families. In
1990, the ten-year moratorium on land takings set by the Lancaster House
Agreement expired, finding the goals of the ZANU-PF unrealized. 4
Parliament, in December 1990 and again in 1992, passed legislation
and a constitutional amendment 2 allowing the Zimbabwe government to
confiscate lands, fix the prices it paid for land, and deny the right to appeal
whether the compensation paid was just. 26 Fear resonated in the white
community, and mass protests took place leading to the creation of the
Commercial Farmer's Union (CFU) in an attempt to protect the interests
of Zimbabwean farmers.27 To quell fears at the time, agriculture minister
Witness Mangwende promised Parliament and the CFU that only larger
tracts of unused or underused lands would be confiscated. 2' For the time
being, the CFU was satisfied that this was a promise the Mugabe
government would keep.29
The real fear of a government run amok began in the farming
community between 1992 and 1993, when 83 farms totaling almost
500,000 acres were slated for acquisition, many of them highly productive
or owned by the political opposition of Mugabe, showing that even fully
utilized farms could be taken if deemed necessary. ° With no oversight of
what was or was not just compensation, white farmers began to become
uneasy with the growing gloom. As one farmer put it "It is hard for us to
think of investing ...Farming is a long-term business. If I can't be sure

that I will still have my3land in five to ten years, why should I waste my
time and money on it?" 1
24. Id. at 119-21. By 1990,416,000 people had been resettled onto 6.5 million acres, far short
of 1982 announced intentions of resettling 1,000,000 people before 1985. Id. Further, the rate of
growth in the communal areas was over 40,000 additional families a year, compounding the
problem. Id.
25. ZIMB. CONST. art. 16 § (1) (1990; amended paragraph as inserted by section 3 of Act 9
of 1993). The amended constitution read in part: "(f) except where the property concerned is land
or any interest or right therein, enables any claimant for compensation to apply to the High Court
or some other court for the determination of any question relating to compensation and to appeal
to the Supreme Court." (emphasis added). Id.
26. MERIDIH, supra note 6, at 122.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 124.
29. See id.
30. Id. at 124-25.
31. WEISS, supra note 6, at 192. Ian Smith, the leader of a group who still considered
themselves Rhodesians, stated:
[O]ur government's legislation to circumvent the courts over the question of fair
compensation for private property expropriated by the government is a flagrant
breach of our Declaration of Rights. Moreover, it is a violation of the founding
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The additional legislation still did not bring the number of resettled
households to near what the party had promised, and opposition parties,
such as the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC),3" were beginning
to gain popularity amidst Zimbabweans who thought the land reform
program of the ZANU-PF was wholly ineffective or unconstitutional.33
The impasse was simple and solid; farmers largely refused to give up any
of their land, and the ZANU-PF could not now recant their promises of
land for the rural poor. The battle lines had been drawn.
The problems of the early nineties were but a warning shot for the
chaos to come. The government changed the Land Acquisition Act of 1992
on May 23, 2000 as follows: "In respect of the acquisition of agricultural
land required for resettlement purposes, compensation shall only be
payable for any improvements on or to the land."34 This amendment, in
essence, gave the government carte blanche on taking any and all property
they wanted. The government could claim nearly any social goal as
justification for seizing land.
A list of 2030 properties, published in June 2001, brought the number
of farms anticipating seizure to about 4500. 3 5 A CFU spokesman said at
that time that farms owned by 95% of the 4000 members in the group were
listed for confiscation. 36 White farmers, fed up with the political and
constitutional games the ZANU-PF were playing, refused to leave their
farms.
Starting early in 2000, an armed mob of "veterans" who fought for, or
claimed to have fought for, independence from Britain began moving onto
lands which they called their historical homelands, evicting, intimidating,

principles of the United Nations. . . .Any body which takes unto itself the
autocratic right to sit in judgment on its own case is assuming dictatorial powers
akin to those which were practised by Nazis, fascists and communists.
supra note 6, at 71-72 (quoting Ian Smith, FIN. GAZETTE (Zimbabwe), May 17, 1993.
32. See generally MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE, PROGRAMME FOR CHANGE (1990)
(for a layout of the opposition's platform). The platform states in part: "The MDC will acquire 6-7
million [hectares] of land or resettlement through the acquisition of underutilized, derelict and
multiple owned land, land already identified and designated for the purpose and corruptly acquired
land" and manage the program through a transparent process. Id. at 4.
33. See STIFF, supra note 10, at 302. The CFU, other farmer unions, smaller parties, and other
interests that felt they had been trampled by the Mugabe regime came together in 1999 to form the
new MDC, a party designed to challenge the ZANU-PF in the upcoming 2000 elections. See id.
34. Thomas W. Mitchell, The Land Crisis in Zimbabwe: Getting Beyond the Myopic Focus
Upon Black & White, I IND. INT'L& COMP. L. REV. 587, 596-97 (2001).
35. Zimbabwe Targets White-Owned Farms, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 29, 2001 [hereinafter
MERIDITH,

Zimbabwe Targets].

36. Id. (quoting farmers union spokesman Jerry Grant).
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torturing, and occasionally murdering the whites or opposition party
members, as-well as black farm workers who worked on the large farms.37
Local police refused to get involved, claiming that they had no place in
political issues, and the best solution was to stay out of the conflict.38
By December 2000, the Zimbabwe Supreme Court had seen enough,
holding that the actions of the Mugabe government had repeatedly abused
constitutional rights and violated the law in farming communities. 39 The
Zimbabwe Supreme Court said farmers and their workers, under the
Zimbabwe constitution, had been denied a right to protection from acts of
violence and intimidation.4" Further, the Zimbabwe Supreme Court placed
a moratorium on any future land seizures until the government produced
a "workable programme of land reform."'"
Mugabe answered swiftly. By late 2000, the Chief Justice, Anthony
Gubbay, resigned in fear for his life after numerous death threats from
veterans and ZANU-PF loyalists.42 The Justice Minister, Patrick
Chinamasa, warned the remaining judges "that he could not guarantee
their safety., 43 Seeing the comment as a poorly veiled threat, nearly the
entire Court resigned, replaced by four Mugabe-appointed justices who
soon after declared the farms seizures in Zimbabwe legal and lifted the
moratorium.44 One observer noted, "[t]he judiciary's independence is now
history. The judiciary is in the hands of the politicians. This is a grave and
sad day for Zimbabwe. I hope the international community, especially
jurists, takes note of this. 45
Between 2000 and 2001, veterans seized an estimated 1700 white
commercial farms and were responsible for the deaths of between 4046 and
100 people. 47 In May 2001, the ZANU-PF controlled Parliament passed a
law forbidding the forcible removal of squatters from white-owned farms
37. MERIDITH, supra note 6, at 167. See generally CATHERINE BucKLE, AFRICAN TEARS

(2001) (for a first hand account of life on invaded farms, chronicling one white family's battle to
remain on the land they had purchased after independence and obtained a certificate from the
government that the government had no interest in the property.).
38. See MERIDITH, supra note 6, at 168-69.

39. Zimbabwe Targets,supra note 35.
40. Id.
41.

Peta Thornycroft, Mugabe's Judges Back Seizure of White Farms,TELEGRAPH, Mar. 10,

2001.
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. Id. (quoting professor Masipule Sithole, head of the political science department at the
University of Zimbabwe).
46. See Mitchell, supra note 34, at 588.
47. See Thornycroft, supra note 41.
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and giving them the right to remain on the land until they are allocated
plots on nationalized farms.48 Most recently, Mugabe and the war veterans
have begun an all out attack on members of the opposition party and the
remaining independent or foreign journalists in the country.4 9 By
intimidating the Zimbabwe Supreme Court justices into resignation,
attacking the opposition parties and non-state owned newspapers, allowing
mass corruption in the land redistribution scheme to continue, and with
strong allegations of voter fraud in the 2002 elections, the Mugabe regime
had transformed from a democratically elected responsible and socially
minded government to a semi-fascist oligarchy which still had done little
for the rural poor.
In an attempt to broker some sort of peace, the United Nations, Britain
and other Commonwealth states, and Western nations, meeting in Abuja,
Nigeria, helped draft a new land reform policy that did not violate the
constitutional and human rights of Zimbabweans (Abuja Agreement).5"
However, since the Abuja meeting, Mugabe has largely ignored the
agreement, and U.N. observers say conditions inside Zimbabwe are
worsening rather than improving.5' At last report, the United States and
U.N. observers reported that the food aid to starving Zimbabweans was
being disrupted by ZANU-PF who were distributing the food only to party
loyalists.52 Their attempts to get food aid to nearly one million

48. Zimbabwe Targets, supra note 35.
49. Zimbabwe Raid on Opposition HQ, BBC ONUNE, Aug. 27,2002, at http://news.bbc.co.
uk/l/hi/world/africa/2219082.stm (last visited Apr. 1,2003).
50. The Abuja Agreement on'Zimbabwe Land Reform, Sept. 6, 2001, at http://www.africa
online.com/site/Articles/1,3,35771 .jsp (last visited Apr. 1, 2003) (which reads in part: "Zimbabwe
has agreed... to end all illegal occupations of white-owned farmland and return the country to the
rule of law, in return for financial assistance." The Agreement goes on to state that, as a result of
the historical injustices, the Zimbabwe land situation endangers the stability of both southern
Africa, and the whole continent, and that is why a land reform program in Zimbabwe must adhere
to "human rights, the rule of law, transparency and democratic principles."). The Zimbabwe
delegation promised (1) that no more farms will be occupied; (2) to remove farms that do not meet
set criteria from the lists and move squatters on those farms to lands acquired legally; (3) to speed
up talks with the U.N. Development Programme; (4) to reinstate the rule of law; and (5) to invite
the delegation to visit Zimbabwe and see the current situation. The United Kingdom also promised
to contribute significantly to fund the land reform program, and encouraged other international
organizations to do the same. Id.
51. See U.N. Eyes Zimbabwe Land Reforms, CNN ONLINE, Nov. 15, 2001 (out of print
document, on file with author).
52. See U.N. Urged to Intervene to Stop Partisan Food Distribution, DAILY NEWS, Nov. 8,
2002.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

9

FLORIDA
JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL
LAW
Florida Journal of
International
Law,
Vol. 15, Iss.
4 [2003], Art. 5

[Vol. 15

Zimbabweans who are facing acute hunger is failing because ZANU-PF
bosses refuse to distribute maize to anyone without a ZANU-PF card.53

I1.ANALYSIS
How did a country blessed with such a robust agricultural sector at
independence manage to spiral into chaos in a mere twenty years? Land
reform is both necessary and appropriate in the Zimbabwe context. The
54
vestiges of apartheid and colonialism are both internationally abhorred
and considered a major problem which countries should be given wide
discretion to undo.5 5 This section of the paper will attempt to lay out the
relationship between development theory, property rights theory, the rule
of law, human rights 'and the historical baggage that makes this process in
Zimbabwe so difficult.
A. Death of the Rule of Law and Corruption
1. Rule of Law and an Independent Judiciary
The recent resignation of all but one of the Zimbabwe Supreme Court
justices and the subsequent overturning of previous court decisions puts
into question the adherence of Mugabe to the rule of law.56 The rule of law
is best summarized as a set of ground rules by which all participants must
adhere. The reasoning behind this is simple: "well-defined and equitably
enforced laws allow market participants to make rational decisions and to
protect their contractual and property rights."5 7 Creating an independent
judiciary to hear complaints of citizens against their government is a
keystone of this concept. Without an independent judiciary, those who feel
that their rights are being infringed have no options except resorting to
violence in defending their current home, or leaving Zimbabwe altogether.
Further, without any judicial oversight for the process, the corruption
and political back-scratching could destroy the perception of legitimacy
and ultimately the goals of the entire process. As one observer points out:

53. ld.
54. See International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, Nov. 30, 1973, art. Il,G.A. Res. 3068, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N.
Doc. A/9030 (1974), reprintedin 13 I.L.M. 50, 1015 U.N.T.S. 244.

55. Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
56. See Thornycroft, supra note 41.
57. Emily Johnson Barton, PricingJudicialIndependence: an EmpiricalStudy of Post-1997
Court of FinalAppeal Decisions in Hong Kong, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 361, 362-63 (2002).
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"[tihe situation presently seems to be favouring rich blacks, whilst
communal farmers are not witnessing any changes at all."58 If there is no
independent Supreme Court to enforce a constitution, does the
responsibility fall on the international community, and if so, is there an
international forum for interpreting and enforcing gross violations of
domestic constitutions? The current answer seems to be no. The solution
is often sanctions or embargos, but as international law grows as a forum,
an international constitutional court may be required to address situations
such as this. When one party controls nearly all aspects of politics, and is
at the same time held in high regard because of their pre-state activities in
fighting apartheid and colonialism, the decisions made by the party often
go unchecked. Politics in Zimbabwe are very one-sided; ZANU-PF
dominates nearly the entire country. The rise of a rival party, the MDC, in
1999 also saw an increase in the amount of political, cultural and racerelated violence, particularly in rural areas and against the MDC.5 9 Once
the independence of the judiciary was destroyed, only the private sector
(i.e., the MDC and independent press sources) was left to challenge any
actions of the ZANU-PF party. Recent reports of attacks on the few
independent newspapers reporting out of Harare, and the raiding of MDC
party headquarters, illustrates a full trend towards despotism trampling the
rule of law.
The inability of the poor to separate party loyalty from loyalty to a
particular politician and, more importantly, from national pride is
something that has allowed political parties worldwide to spill into
dangerous nationalistic dogma. t° Separating a sense of self-nationally,
politically, and ethnically - is something very important to politics in the
developing world. The rhetoric of Mugabe often intentionally blurs this
line, with statements labeling the MDC, independent press, and the white
farmers as enemies of Zimbabwe. 6' Perhaps they are enemies of the
ZANU-PF, but it is doubtful they want to see a return to Rhodesian rule.

58. MAcGARRY, supra note 16, at 4.

59. See STIFF, supra note 10, at 302-03.
60. One interesting observation is that both the South African and the Zimbabwean flags
incorporate the party colors and symbols of the ANC and ZANU-PF respectively.
61. See Heather Boyle, The Land Problem: What Does the FutureHoldfor South Africa's
Land Reform Program?, II IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 665, 684 (2001); see also STIFF, supra
note 10, at 303. The MDC took 57 of the 120 elected seats in parliament, winning all seats in urban
areas, and possibly would have gained even more seats, except that MDC members seldom
campaigned in rural areas for fear of attacks. See Masipula Sithole, Where Do We Go From Here?
Election 2000 in Perspective, AGENDA, Nov. 2000, at http://www.nca.org.zw/html/archive/

articles/elections/mspersp00l I b.htm (last visited May 13, 2003).
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Admittedly, much of the violence being carried out in the countryside
is a result of private individuals, in particular the "veterans," taking the
law into their own hands. Mugabe continues to claim that he is not directly
involved in sponsoring the violence, and that the government will not
interfere because that would only increase the violence.6" However, the
strong ties of Mugabe to those committing the violence and his failure to
stop the violence suggests otherwise. Decisions by the parliament to not
act in evicting the war veterans; the official policy of the police of
neutrality despite allowing several whites who had taken refuge at police
stations to be dragged out and killed; rural ZANU-PF party leaders
involvement in farm violence against non aligned or MDC party members;
the failure to protect the Zimbabwe Supreme Court judges from threats of
violence and the statement by Mugabe that whites are enemies of
Zimbabwe all suggest that this government is more involved in the push
to drive whites off the land than the international community has been led
to believe.63
2. Human Rights Abuses
While Zimbabwe may have had a case for their land reform scheme
based solely on their need to update a defunct land ownership system and
move forward with development, the human rights violations which
accompanied the most recent phases of the land reform program could
give the United Nations or other international bodies grounds for action.
For example, U.S. President Roosevelt suggested that any transnational
body must protect four fundamental freedoms: freedom from want, from
fear, freedom of speech and expression, and freedom in conscience and
belief.' The protection of these freedoms underlies most U.N. action and
declarations even today.
The enforcement branch of the United Nations is the U.N. Security
Council, set up to maintain international peace and security.65 In 1965, the
Southern Rhodesian government declared its independence amidst
66
pressure from the United Kingdom to do away with its apartheid regimes.
In 1966, for the first time in history, the U.N. Security Council authorized
intervention and blockades to help stop apartheid in Rhodesia.67 With this
62. See MERIDrrH, supra note 6, at 172.
63. Id. at 168-77.
64. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, "Four Freedoms" Speech to the Congress of the
United States (Jan. 6, 1941).
65. U.N. CHARTER art. 24.

66. See GLENNON, supra note 9, at 114-16.
67. See id. at 115-16.
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action, the United Nations rejected the notion of absolute sovereignty and
stated that U.N. Security Council intervention was justified since
deprivation of human rights creates international instability, and the
United Nations had pledged to protect human rights. Now, the roles seem
reversed. It is no longer the ninety-eight percent who are being oppressed,
but now the white minority who were initially in power whose human
rights are being violated in order to drive them out of the country.
International human rights law has developed rapidly in the past few
decades. Mugabe and the actions of war veterans could constitute
violations of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination,68 the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 69 and even the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.70 As violations of these conventions
constitute crimes against humanity, Mugabe could be labeled a war
criminal, and like Milosevic before him, stand trial before the international
community.
The danger in this is that once put in perspective, the problems in
Zimbabwe do not reach the significant levels necessary to be termed

68. International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, Jan.
4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD].
[R]acial discrimination . . . mean[s] any distinction, exclusion, restriction or
preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has
the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or
exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.
Id. art. 1. Mugabe's actions could be considered violations of "[tihe right ... of persons [to]
protection by the State against violence or bodily harm, whether inflicted by government officials
or by any individual, group or institution." Id. art. 5(b).
69. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,999 U.N.T.S. 171,
art. 20. "Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law." Id.
70. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277. Article 2 states:
[G]enocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy,
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a)
[k]illing members of the group; (b) [c]ausing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group; (c) [d]eliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.
Id. art. 2. Article 3(c) makes clear that "(d]irect and public incitement to commit genocide" is
punishable. Id. art 3.
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genocide or large-scale human rights abuses. First, as of 1999-2000 there
were fewer than 50,000 white Zimbabweans, less than 4000 of which were
farmers, in a country with a population of over 12 million.7 Second, much
of the violence is not technically state sponsored, though there are strong
links between the groups committing the violence and the Mugabe
government.7 2 Only the public anti-white rhetoric of Mugabe could be
considered in violation of the genocide convention by "deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part. 7 3 Whether white Rhodesians
constitute an ethnic, racial, or cultural group entitled to U.N. protection is
likewise unclear.
At this point, prosecuting Mugabe, under international law would be
difficult, given the far more evil and dangerous despots in other parts of
the world and his continued popularity as a celebrated Zimbabwean war
hero. Any intervention would be seen as neo-imperialistic protection of
white capitalist interests, and would significantly damage Western/African
relations.
Because the reports coming out of Zimbabwe suggest much of the
violence is not outwardly state-sponsored, and assuming the West does not
act in an interventionist manner, any kind of conflict resolution must
recognize both sides of the debate. Mugabe and the ZANU-PF loyalists
have been attempting to create a land reform program for over twenty
years now and have been constantly frustrated, first by the Lancaster
Agreement, then by the farmers unwillingness to sell, then by a Zimbabwe
Supreme Court that ruled their program unconstitutional. The sense of
frustration must be enormous, and now, despite the disapproval of the
international community, the government is finally seeing some progress
in resettlement. 74 Thus, even if this action would qualify as genocide, it
75
may be far less damaging now than were the problem to fester for years.

71. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: ZIMBABWE, at http://www.state.
gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5479.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2003).
72. Reports indicate that the war veterans currently occupying many of the farms in
Zimbabwe arrived in government army trucks, and the same trucks are bringing supplies and
rations to the encamped groups even now. MERIDITH, supra note 6, at 167.
73. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 70,
art. 2(c).
74. With most whites having fled to other countries, the problem is largely solving itself,
though not in the fairest or most lawful way.
75. See generally Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 584-85 (1823) (for an insight into the
justification of genocide as a means to ending long-standing and difficult conflicts; the U.S.
Supreme Court justified the destruction of Indian tribes in order to avoid ongoing conflict, since
they could not be assimilated, nor governed).
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However, seizing lands and failing to recognize a right to property creates
long-term problems of its own. Understanding who has a right to property,
and the relationship of that right to a right of development is necessary in
order to find an equitable solution to the land problem of Zimbabwe.
B. The Land DistributionIssue
1. Theories of Property
Understanding when a property right comes into existence and who
should have the property right are important questions with far reaching
implications. The Western theory of property rights is laid out in the
famous property case Pierson v. Post,76 where an early U.S. court split on
the issue of whether it was actually possessing something that created a
property right (majority), or merely exerting effort in pursuit of bringing
something into possession (dissent)." However, possession is a far more
difficult term to define in the realm of land than when dealing with foxes.
In the 1919 British case In re Southern Rhodesia, an English court
validated the confiscation of lands from the native Africans, arguing that
since the Africans had a primitive notion of property, they could not be
said to possess or own the property on which they lived and worked.78
Thus, the poor understanding of the English court of the complete notion
of what constitutes a property right led to the dispossession overnight of
millions of tribesmen living in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe).79 At
the very root of the conflict in Zimbabwe is the fundamental question that
underlies most property disputes: what is it that creates rights in property,
and who grants and enforces those rights? Five competing doctrines exist:
(1) first possession and labor; (2) positivism; (3) natural rights theory; (4)
utilitarianism and efficiency; and (5) a might makes right hybrid, including
conquest and exploration. 0
The first possessors of all the lands in question were (arguably) the
native inhabitants of what is now Zimbabwe. 8' By working the land, they

76. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805).
77. See id.
78. See Nagan, supra note 2, at 4.
79. See id.
80. See JOSEPH SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POUCIES AND PRACTICES 12-23 (2d ed.
1997).
81. Some scholars have argued that primitive societies who use the land in a less than
intensive method may be considered, under Locke's treatises on property, as in a "state of nature,"
and thus without any claim to property rights. Id. at 13.
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set down a claim to the land, regardless of a lack of legal formalism such
as deeds that exist in the modern world. Thus, possession of the lands
exists in the recognition by other tribe members and outsiders that a person
has exclusive control, use and enjoyment of a certain area, not a formal
document or exact property lines.
Positivists would counter that no one had rights in the land until an
organized system of government created a system of laws. 2 Until a system
for mapping and putting others on notice of ownership is set up, rights in
property cannot exist because there is no exclusivity. Filing a deed requires
examination to determine if anyone else holds claim to the land. The
problem is, positivists refrain from normative judgments on the law, and
adhere strictly to the law as written.83 Whether the property laws excluded
black ownership as under apartheid, or the laws allowed the ZANU-PF to
take the lands without compensation, that was the law, and that dictated
who had rights in property. Thus, a discriminatory system such as
apartheid, often excludes members of society unfairly and undermines the
argument that the law is the law and should be adhered to.
Natural rights.theory is more normative, suggesting that some rights are
so important, morally, and for society in general, that they deserve legal
protection and override public policy considerations. 4 John Locke and
others have argued that acquiring a right to land through labor and
ingenuity is one of the most fundamental rights that should not be
disturbed even for good social policy. 5 The question, in the Zimbabwe
context, is which way does this cut? The natives of southern Africa will
argue their natural rights were infringed upon by the colonialists, and the
white farmers will argue they have a natural right in the land because of
their toil and investment.
Utilitarians look to create property rules that maximize social utility,
86
in other words the "greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.,
In this situation, helping the huge landless class of Zimbabwe to alleviate
substandard living conditions seems the obvious choice for the utilitarian.
However, the pre-seizure reality in Zimbabwe was an incredibly strong
agricultural sector, with the third highest production of tobacco (perhaps

82. See id. at 16.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 17.
85. See generally JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT ch. 5, (1690).
86. See generally Guido Calebrisi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, LiabilityRules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
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the.most lucrative per-square-acre crop) in the world.8 7 The money coming
into Zimbabwe from foreign purchasers, and the employment by the farms
of thousands of Zimbabweans, may counterbalance the argument for
seizures. The current landowners have an edge in economies of scale,
technology, and experience over the new farmers. While little empirical
evidence exists to show that big farms are more efficient than individually
owned smaller tracts, the lack of education, assistance, and funding that
the Zimbabwe government has put forth all but ensures that only the most
basic subsistence farming will be possible under the new distribution
system.88
Finally, the harsh reality of property rights in the absence of any legal
enforcement body is the might-makes-right model, as is evident from five
hundred years of colonialism, warfare, and the current situation in
Zimbabwe today. Here, the question is which group can subjugate the
other, and force them to surrender any claims they may have on the land.
The problem is that any surrender of rights in this context is not voluntary,
and often the displaced will continue to feel they have a rightful claim to
historic homelands awaiting and will await a time when the political
situation changes enough that they can assert that claim.
In the significant amount of time that has passed since the initial
seizure of land by colonizing powers, the land has continued to exist in an
open market place, being bought, sold, farmed, built upon, given, and
devised through the years under a Western system of title. Each transaction
occurred with the purchaser believing the title they were acquiring was
secure from extrinsic claims of third parties to rights in the parcel. Now,
a change in policy has created the problem of the bona-fide purchaser on
a national level. 89 Further, English and U.S. law recognizes adverse
possession on the land, which the current owners will argue voids out any

87. Behind only the United States and Brazil, Zimbabwean production has dropped markedly
since the land seizures began. See Zimbabwe Tobacco Association web site, at http://www.zta.co.
zw/page.asp?id=7 (last visited Apr. 1, 2003).
88. See Wakabi, supra note 4.
89. See generally O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980). In this case, a
painting was stolen from O'Keeffe, then sold to an innocent third party. Under the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) section 2-403, "a person with voidable title has power to transfer a good
title to a good faith purchaser for value." U.C.C. § 2-403 (2000). However, voidable title exists only
if the property in question was acquired using some sort of fraud, not outright theft. In the context
of Zimbabwe, it is unclear whether the Rhodesian colonists defrauded the native inhabitants out of
their land, or outright stole it.
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claim the original inhabitants might have had. 90 But without a legal system
that allows standing before the court of indigenous claims to the land, the
argument is fairly preposterous. How can the current owners be
dispossessed of property they believed they were receiving, from the state
or another party, in fee simple absolute?
Just as those families who were dispossessed in the past feel a strong
emotional, spiritual, and group connectedness to the land, "there are many
elements of the white farmers' relationship to the land that may be
analogous to those cultures which have a communitarian approach to
land." 9 ' The white settlers have poured decades of sweat equity, as well as
money and time, into converting the land into a productive piece of
agricultural property, and thus feel a connectedness to the land that their
predecessors had farmed.
The result is an us/them matrix that is difficult to escape.92 The white
farmers hold a deed to the land that they feel justifies their right to fight for
the land, while the rural poor believe the land has always belonged to
displaced natives. The thinking is this: the Rhodesians used force and
subjugation to dispossess the natives of their land, the deed is just a piece
of paper justifying the theft, and now that the majority has power again,
the natives want their land returned.93
John Locke suggested that rights in private property spring from the
94
investment of toil, imagination and creativity into common property.
Once those rights have been acquired, civil society and the state have a
duty to protect such interests. 95 The current owners put this argument
forward, but the paradigm of Locke does not suggest that the state has a
duty to protect lands stolen through trick or subjugation.'
2. The Relationship of Land and Sustainable Development Schemes in
the Developing World
The importance of equitable distribution of land is particularly vital to
the movement of developing nations into the world economy. On an
individual basis, property ownership serves four important purposes: (1)

90. See O'Keeffe, 83 N.J. at 499. The O'Keeffe court stated "[r]eal estate is fixed and cannot
be moved or concealed. The owner of real property ... can be expected to be aware of open,
notorious, visible, hostile, continuous acts of possession on it." Id.
91. Nagan, supra note 2, at 2.
92. See id.at 4.
93. See id.
94. See LOCKE, supra note 85, ch. 5.
95. See id.
96. See Nagan, supra note 2, at 13.
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it gives people the opportunity to become self sufficient, and thus no
longer a drain on the resources of the state; (2) it allows citizens resources
necessary to create a return on an investment; (3) it gives people equity in
land which they can use as collateral for loans; and (4) it creates political
and economic stability. As the U.N. Special Rapporteur put it, "[w]ithout
adequate legal tenure the threat of eviction or displacement never ceases
and the possibility for all sectors to exercise individual self-determination
and plan for a future are severely curtailed."'9 7
Further, a mere feeling of security in rights to land is vital in the third
world context. Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto suggests that it is
not a lack of resources but rather the lack of "an integrated property law
system that would allow hard-working pioneers to become full-blown
modern capitalists." 98 De Soto concludes that the Third World must
"document and formalize property rights, provide legal title to land, and
integrate diverse norms into a single system of property law." 99
Zimbabwe is no exception. As the current situation illustrates, a lack
of security in land, even with an integrated system of title, creates
economic havoc. U.S. courts, having recognized the danger of a fluid body
of property law have attempted to set a significant body of precedent to
help alleviate feelings of insecurities in land.
3. Takings: the United States
Although U.S. takings jurisprudence has become a whole, highly
evolved doctrine focusing on the U.S. Constitution, the basic common law
reasoning for banning uncompensated takings is that a government who
can arbitrarily seize the property of others creates instability, both
politically and economically. In most countries with such constitutional
provisions, the government must justify their takings through their police
powers, defined loosely as the protection of the health, safety, and welfare
of the citizenry."0
The U.S. Supreme Court has also held "[o]ne person's property may
not be taken for the benefit of another private person without a justifying
public purpose, even though compensation be paid."' 0 ' Zimbabwe would
argue that the justifying public purpose is alleviating the squatter problem
97. Id. at 9.
98. Solomon Greene, Recent Publications27 YALE J. INT'L L. 453, 454 (2002) (quoting
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND

FAILs EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000)).
99. Id.
100. See generally Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
101. Thompson v. Consol. Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937).
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and redistributing the land more evenly. Moreover, U.S. takings cases, if
stretched only slightly, could even seem to justify the action of the
Mugabe government. In Hawaiian Housing Authority v. Midkiff, °2 the
U.S. Supreme Court held that a land redistribution system 113 designed to
redistribute land from a few centralized owners to a more diversified and
widespread ownership was constitutional since it served the legitimate
governmental interest of "reduc[ing] the perceived social and economic
evils of a land oligopoly."'" In Midkiff, the recipients of the title in the
land were already living on it, thus having possession of the property in
question.'05 The Land Reform Act of Hawaii merely transferred the title
from large trusts and defunct estates, to the current tenants for a fair
market value to be paid by the states."
In the Zimbabwean context, the squatters are present on the land
through violent invasion, not some sort of purchased property interest.
Zimbabwe did not pay reparations to the owners of the farms that are
being seized, but have argued that the lands were stolen and Britain should
pay the reparations. 01 7 The situation would be analogous if the Native
Americans whose lands were taken by conquest were a sizable majority of
the population, regained power and retook lands that had been seized by
the United States and the colonial powers before them."0 8 In essence,
Mugabe argues that the nation of Rhodesia never had the authority of
governance to allow it to sell land to the white settlers.
The debate over U.S. takings law has spun off many theoretical
approaches to the relationship of a sovereign to land. In attempting to
understand when a taking is justified, some scholars point to a formulaic
approach, arguing that efficiency gains must be greater than settlement
costs plus demoralization costs in order to justify a taking.'°9 Settlement
costs are generally the compensation to be paid for the taking, while
demoralization costs are the loss in faith in the government or the land
tenure system that would occur if land was arbitrarily seized without
compensation. "o "When pursuit of efficiency gains entails capricious

102. Hawaiian Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
103. Land Reform Act of 1967, HAW. REV. STAT. § 526 (1967).
104. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241-42.
105. See id. at 233.
106. Id.
107. See Zimbabwe Targets, supra note 35.
108. For acomparable situation in U.S. courts, consider Tee-Hit-Ton Indians vs. United States,
348 U.S. 272 (1955), if it had been decided by a Native American Court.
109. See Frank Michelman, Property,Utility, and Fairness:Comments on EthicalFoundations
of 'Just Compensation' Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967).
110. Id.
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redistribution, either demoralization costs or settlement costs must be
incurred.""'
As applied to Zimbabwe, however, the lack of capital to pay settlement
costs, and the fact that demoralization costs can be isolated to a discrete
and insular minority, throws a wrench into the workings of the theoretical
approach. By using propaganda, Mugabe assures the rest of the country
that they have nothing to fear, and this is an attack on only the colonialist
white farmers who stole the land in the first place. The consequence of
attacking a minority, even one that is economically powerful, may
inadvertently be that all citizens with property rights ask: what is to stop
the government from seizing my land? With this fear in their minds,
people are less likely to invest capital or even sweat equity into the land
if their interest is de facto unsecured. Simply put, insecurity in land
discourages investment in that land, and leads to a meltdown of the agribusiness section of a country, and the economy.
Obviously, Zimbabwe need not answer to the U.S. Constitution. Their
own constitution has been amended by the legislature anytime there is any
question as to the legality of the actions of Mugabe, and a non-autonomous
Supreme Court is powerless to rule these changes unconstitutional.' With
no legal oversight, the remaining branches of government are free to do
whatever they please.
The international community and multinational organizations have
become the guardians of natural rights in the last half of the Twentieth
Century. The question of protecting property rights has been one of
clashing ideological values, with the former Communist Bloc not
recognizing private ownership while the West depended on it. With the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of a global economy, creating an
overarching right to security in land seems more important and plausible
than ever.
4. International Law and Natural Property Rights
Since, according to Locke, the entire function of law and civil society
is to protect the natural right of an individual to security from arbitrary
seizure and protect the right to undisturbed enjoyment and possession of
their land, the situation begs the question: should the international
community protect this right from encroachment by states?

111. Id.
112. See Thornycroft, supra note 41.
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Between sovereigns, the right to exclusive free enjoyment and security
in property ownership is a clear principle of international law.' 3 Once a
nation claims sovereignty over a piece of land, and is recognized as a
sovereign, other nations who invade or otherwise affect those lands4
without consent of the sovereign are in violation of international law. 11
But on an individual basis, it could strongly undermine the sovereign
authority if a comprehensive international body of takings law existed.
5. Existing International Law Documents Protecting Property
The existing body of international law protecting property rights is
scattered throughout a variety of U.N. and regional human rights
documents. The most dispositive document on the question is Article 17
of the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights, (UNDHR 17) which reads: "(1)
Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with
others. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.""' 5 The
same basic points occur in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights." 16 Both have been the focus of much debate and
contention."' UNDHR 17 is controversial, primarily because it is unclear
whether the right to undisturbed enjoyment of property stands as an ivory
tower, or is contingent upon not coming into conflict with the other
provisions of the UNDHR or international law." 8 If the right to
undisturbed ownership of property is seen as standing as an absolute right,
this right could trump other rights guaranteed by international human
rights law.
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination protects ownership of property rights from
haphazard interference from the state based on any form of race-based
discrimination." 9 The inherent conflict between the right of the state to
sovereignty over its internal decisions, and the right of an individual to
security in property or right to development all come into inconsistent

113. See, e.g., Anthony Arend, InternationalLaw and Rogue States: The Failure of the
CharterFramework, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 735 (2002).
114. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRes/660
(1990); see also U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7).
115. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/810, (1948), art. 17.
116. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 69, art. 17.
117. See, e.g., Audrey Chapman, A New Approach to Monitoring the InternationalCovenant
on Economic, Social and CulturalRights in THE REVIEW, 23-38 n.55 (Dec. 1995).
118. See Nagan, supra note 2, at 8.
119. CERD, supra note 68, art. 5(d) (v).
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conflict when applied to a real world situation like Zimbabwe. The
difficult question for all of these documents is whether the conflict is
significant enough to warrant foreign intervention.
C. Development Theory in Africa
As colonial powers began their retraction in the late Nineteenth and
early Twentieth Centuries, Western academics began assessing the
economic disparity between the undeveloped and the developed world.
The initial solution put forth by development theorists was the market
approach to development, suggesting that mass production and
consumerism would create a cycle to "lift all boats.' 20 Accelerated
industrialization, as it was known, was seen by much of Africa as a neoto gain economic, if not political, power over the
colonial 12
attempt
1
continent.
Theorists who rejected this model as either misguided or a neocolonial
attempt at reasserting control then turned to a development scheme
designed to fulfill the basic needs of the populace, since "unless existence
needs are satisfied, people will not be concerned with higher order
needs.' ' 122 Agropolitan development, as this grass-roots theory was called,
suggested that a successful development program
23 must focus on giving the
people the fundamentals they need to survive.
Many African leaders, including Mugabe, took this model to heart.
They believed that fulfilling first order needs, such as food and shelter,
was the most important and immediate goal of any African state. The oneparty African state became the norm, developing huge social welfare
24
programs for the people, often with little capital to pay for the programs. 1
D. InternationalDoctrinesSecuring a Right to Development
The United Nations has repeatedly recognized the right to development
as a fundamental human right. 25 Consequently, the land reform question
120. CHARLES GORE, REGIONS INQUESTION 164-65 (1984).
121. See id.
122. RONALD INGLEHART, CULTURE SHIFT IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 152 (1990).
123. See GORE, supra note 120, at 164-65; see also PATRICK CHABAL, POWER INAFRICA
(1994).
124. See generally CHABAL, supra note 123.
125. Recognizing the necessity of land for development and stability, the U.N. General
Assembly stated: "development is a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process,
which arrives at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population ... and in the
fair distribution of the benefits resulting therefrom." Nagan, supra note 2, at 10 (quoting G.A. Res.
41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., 97th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128 (1986)).
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becomes far more difficult when one considers the human rights of those
who have been dispossessed of their land by colonization, racist regimes,
and economic injustice, which all acted in concert to26dispossess the
African people of any rights in land they may have had.1
Implicit in a right to development is the right to access the resources
necessary to become a market participant, or at the least, to self-sustain.
The most important of these resources is a secured right in property. The
psychological effect of land ownership on the self-worth and dignity of an
individual helps to create actors within a society who seek the betterment
of the state as a whole. 127 Thus, land issues must be set on one side of the
scale, while the rights of the rural landless to development must be placed
as a counterweight, thus allowing the problem to be seen in its entire
socioeconomic context. 2 Winston Nagan sees the conflict between human
rights and property rights as a simple interpretation issue, arguing UNDHR
17's "meaning is to be derived from the relevant context... but guided 12by9
the overriding goal values implicit in the human dignity concept."
However, whether the right to development enjoys the same protections
other human rights is less clear, since the right is not incorporated in the
UNDHR, but rather in a sister document, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESC). 3 °
Relevant provisions of the ICESC indicate "State Parties to the present
Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living
for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing,
and to the continuous improvement of his living conditions." '' However,
it is an underdeveloped area of international law whether the right of a
state to enact a policy initiative to assist in development is important
enough to outweigh the rights of landowners to security from land seizure.
As is the case in Zimbabwe, when a judiciary ceases to function
independently and no international civil or constitutional court exists, there
is no oversight, other than that of a despot of a nation, to find a balance
between the right to development and the right to security in property,
unless the international community intervenes.
A serious criticism of the ICESC is its lack of enforcement powers,
leaving it primarily a doctrine involved in data collection and

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
U.N.T.S.
131.

See id. at 2.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 9.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
3.
Id.art. 11.
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recommendations.' 32 The ICESC grants that "[d]eveloping countries, with
due regard to human rights and their national economy, may determine to
what extent they would guarantee the economic rights recognized in the
present covenant to non-nationals."' 33 Thus, the document not only has
limited enforcement powers, but it likewise permits developing nations to
exact seizures of foreign-owned land, if they deem it is necessary.
Zimbabwe may argue this codifies their right to evict foreign landowners
(or even those who still consider themselves Rhodesians) who have large
estates.
The Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples recognizes
that land in tribal communal cultures is a fundamental tenet of the sense
of self of an individual." The Draft Declaration cites "the urgent need to
respect and promote the inherent rights and characteristics of indigenous
peoples, especially their rights to land" to allow them to "freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development" and have a right to
redress for "any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them
of their lands, territories or resources."' 35 The right to redress is the clear
issue here - the state that perpetrated apartheid has vanished, and the
current owners inherited the responsibility for redress. Thus the crucial
question remains: is seizing and redistributing the lands converted to white
ownership under the Rhodesian regime acceptable in the eyes of the
international community as an appropriate redress?
Within the African Charter on Human and People's rights, the memberstates undertake to "eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa...
achieve the total liberation of Africa, . . . eliminate colonialism, neocolonialism, apartheid, [and] zionism."' 36 Signed by member-states a year
after Zimbabwe gained independence, and while much of southern Africa
was still dealing with colonialism and apartheid, the document is largely
a showing of pan-African solidarity in an attempt to create a continental
support network for the fledgling and still embattled nations. One of the
most radical provisions of the African Charter states "dispossessed people
shall have the right to the lawful recovery of [their] property as well as to
an adequate compensation" and "[s]tates parties to the present Charter

132. See generally id.
133. Id. art. 2(3).
134. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SUB.2/1994/2/
Add. 1 (1994), availableat http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/declra.htm (last visited Apr. 1,
2003) [hereinafter Draft Declaration].
135. Id. pmbl., arts. 3, 7(b).
136. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/
67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
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shall undertake to eliminate all forms of foreign economic exploitation
particularly that practiced by international monopolies so as to enable their
peoples to fully benefit from the advantages derived from their national
' Zimbabwe could largely rely on this as a notice to investors
resources." 137
in Zimbabwe, as well as across Africa, that foreign economic interests
would not be protected at the expense of Africans.
Zimbabwe was a latecomer to the development game, and presumably
could have learned from the failures of other development experiments
such as those in Nigeria or Zaire. 3 ' Unfortunately, the lesson went only
half learned. Mugabe recognized that Zimbabwe did not have the
resources available to launch into large social programs, but the early,
closely fought elections forced Mugabe and the ZANU-PF leadership to
make promises that he knew could not be kept. Initially, Zimbabwe
sought, through a development scheme and its land redistribution system,
to at least alleviate the most brutal of the lasting effects of apartheid on the
rural landless.'39 However, through corruption and despotism, Mugabe lost
sight of the fact that any development proposal must unite land reform
with empowerment by not just handing out land, but teach the technical
skills necessary to use the resource and not alienate groups and lose the
faith of the people in the process.' 40
E. Moving Forward:Uniting a Right to Development with a Right to
Security in Property
An international agreement on the rights of citizens in their property,
and the interaction of that right to the right of a state to autonomous
development would go a long way not only in creating stability and
investment in developing nations, but also ensuring development plans are
fair and equitable. Investors sight their primary reason for avoiding
potential market places is political instability. Lessons learned from past
experiments in redistribution show that seldom can an outright
taking constitute good policy, for the state or for
uncompensated
41
individuals.'

137. Id. art. 21, §§ 2 & 5.
138. See CHABAL, supra note 123, at 163. At a time, Nigeria's oil boom made it one of the
richest nations on the continent. Within just a few short years, through ineffective social programs,
war, corruption, and squandering, the country was back below where it had been before the oil
boom. See id.
139. MERIDITH, supra note 6, at 114-21; see also Nagan, supra note 2, at 10.
140. See Nagan, supra note 2, at 3.
141. One need only look at the failed attempts in Eastern Europe and the environmental and
socioeconomic nightmare that resulted in order to find evidence of the danger of experimenting
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Land seizures are often accompanied with rhetoric about the supremacy
of one group over another, whether nationalistic, tribal or racial, making
them a warning shot of greater human rights abuses to come. Mugabe has
repeatedly violated the human rights of Zimbabweans; "whether it is the
massacre of members of the Ndebele tribe in the early eighties, attacks on
gays in the early nineties, [or] white farmers and Britain, the game has
been played by the same rules: an irradiated nationalism unleashed with
dramatic eloquence."'' 42 The same routine plays out in countless contexts,
the villainization of groups in order to bring a country together is a
political tool that has been widely used by fascist and communist alike.
Thus, these wholesale takings reflect a lack of good governance: takings
without compensation are a good indicator of dangerous, anti-democratic
and corrupt governments.
F. Is Intervention Properto Stop the Violence?
U.N. intervention should be reserved for only the gravest conflicts.
Regional pressure from neighbor states such as South Africa is the ideal
path, because it precludes any claims of neo-imperialism or racist
motives. 43 Thabo Mbeke, the leader of South Africa, has stated that land
seizures such as those in Zimbabwe would not be tolerated in South
Africa, and encourages Zimbabwe to employ fair land reform programs
and stop seizures.'44
The Zimbabwe land redistribution scheme started with a simple idea
and good intentions. However, a lack of rigid allegiance to the principles
of the constitution and a refusal to adhere to other human rights doctrines
has turned this experiment into utter failure. Violence is often the result of
a frustration when the progress promised is far from complete, or the path
seems too difficult to continue down. In Zimbabwe, this attempt to soften
the backlash from years of oppression was a failure. Many in the West
would seek to place exclusive blame on the Zimbabwe government,
however this belittles the actual complexity of the problem, and the real
need for some solution to the ownership gap.
As one local observer explains, the land taking has become an issue
that has little to do with redistribution, and everything to do with keeping
the discredited ZANU-PF party in power. Some of us insist that the land
with land systems too excessively. See generally East Europe's Dark Dawn, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC,
June 1991, at 36-70.
142. Sibanda, supra note 14.
143. See Wakabi, supra note 4.
144. See Barry Baxter, Zim Land Reform Not Handled Correctly- Mbeki, at http://allafrica.
com/stories/200303210012.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2003).
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imbalance could have been dealt with in a firm but humane way without
violence and lawlessness. There was totally no need for the state to teach
[black] children to hate their countrymen. 45 The Zimbabwe government
and the land reform program
has portrayed whites as racist neocolonialists,
46
domination.
racial
against
stand
as a
IV. CONCLUSION

Land reform, or the lack thereof, will continue to be the most pressing
question for the former colonized nations that still struggle with economic
vestiges of the past dualities. In effect, the white farmers of Zimbabwe
have acted as martyrs for the international economic community involved
in foreign investment as a neocolonialism. Without a system to help
groups that were displaced by misguided or racist land tenure systems in
the past, these groups are forced to resort to violence to reclaim the land.
Foreign investment in the Third World would be less unsure if this reality
was acknowledged. The ongoing struggle for these countries to etch out
successful development schemes and deal with promises not kept - by
both the economically advantaged within these countries and the
international community - will most likely become more and more
common in the developing world.' 47 Hopefully, the lessons learned in
Zimbabwe will encourage adversaries in other developing nations to take
less of a staunch stand, and be more willing to compromise. The white
farmers have paid with their farms and their lives; Mugabe and his
ministers will undoubtedly pay with their lives, or through the
villainization that inevitably will come as the present passes into history.
VI. AFTERWORD

As the MDC's popularity has risen, so has the violence the ZANU-PF
loyalists and the veterans are willing to employ to maintain control of the
country. Recent developments include some of the most violent political
attacks and clashes to date. Prior to the elections, police and military

145. Id.
146. See id.
147. Countries such as Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria, and India are all currently dealing with
squatter problems of their own.
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arrested over five hundred protesters and human rights observers. 4 ' Three
of the MDC's leaders, including presidential candidate Morgan Tsvangirai,
were arrested and charged in February 2003 with conspiring to murder
Mugabe, a crime punishable by death. 49 The U.S. State Department has
stated that there is no credible evidence to support any of the charges,
suggesting the trial is another Mugabe ploy to retain power. 5 °
Slowly, ZANU-PF's exclusive control of Zimbabwe is being chiseled
away. In 2003, the MDC won all of Harare's 19 parliament seats, and
many regional seats as well. 5 ' This was perhaps the hardest fought
election to date, since, had ZANU-PF attained a two-thirds majority in
Parliament they could have pushed through many of the constitutional
amendments further undermining land rights. 52 ZANU-PF maintains a
sizable majority, 95 out of 150 seats, but every election sees a drop in that
control. 153
In March 2003, U.S. President Bush signed an executive order
forbidding U.S. corporations from doing business with anyone in the
Zimbabwe hierarchy or the Mugabe regime, and freezing all of Mugabe's
assets held in U.S. banks. 54 The President stated after announcing the
sanctions that "the government of Zimbabwe has systematically
undermined the nation's democratic institutions, employing violence,
intimidation and repressive means, including legislation, to stifle
opposition to its rule."' 5 5 Around the same time, most of Zimbabwe's
national web sites, which espoused Mugabe's rhetoric since they were
maintained by ZANU-PF, went off-line, though it is unclear whether this
is a direct action of the U.S. Government, or a peripheral result of the
United States forbidding business transactions with the government. The
United States and the State Department stated that these new sanctions

148. Jim Lobe, Rights Groups Score Cuban, Other Repression During Iraq War (Apr. 7,

2003), available at http:lstory.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/oneworld/20030407/wlone
world/i 1815_1049738516 (last visited May 13, 2003).
149. CNN.com, Arrests at Zimbabwe Treason Trial (Feb. 3, 2003), at http://edition.cnn.con
20031WORLD/africaO2103/zimbabwe.tsvangiraiO820/index.htm (last visited May 13, 2003).
150. Id.

151. CNN.com, Zimbabwe Opposition Wins Key Elections, (Mar. 31,2003), at http://edition.
cnn.comI20031WORLDlafrica/03131/zimbabwe.election.reutlindex.html (last visited May 13,
2003).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. David Sands, Bush Slaps Zimbabwe with More Sanctions, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2003,
available at http://washingtontimes.com/world/20030308-81027218.htm (last visited May 13,
2003).
155. Id.
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were "aimed not at the people of Zimbabwe but rather at those most
responsible for their current plight" and pledged to continue helping the
Zimbabwe people with food aid and economic assistance.' 56
Unfortunately, as the U.S. political leadership refocused its attention
on the looming war in Iraq, U.S. participation in pressuring ZANU-PF and
Mugabe to adhere to the laws of their constitution all but disappeared.' 57
In April 2003, Mugabe marked Zimbabwe's 23rd anniversary by
reiterating his belief that current international pressure is a neocolonial
attempt at exerting the will of England on Africa.' 58 "Africa is for Africans
and Zimbabwe is for Zimbabweans ...Our land, our dear Zimbabwe will
never again fall into foreign hands. Never, never, never again will
Zimbabwe be a colony."' 159
Any action spearheaded by a Western or European power is likely to
invoke the same rhetoric. Fortunately, other African countries and
organizations are moving to the forefront of creating international pressure
on the Mugabe regime. The Organization for African Unity represents a
trans-African organization able to apply regional pressure on countries like
Zimbabwe to adhere to the rule of law and human rights conventions.
Zimbabwe is far more likely to respond to pressure from the countries who
share its history of colonial domination than external European and
Western pressure. South Africa in particular continues to be both a
somewhat sympathetic neighbor to Zimbabwe, as well as acting as an
example of an internationally acceptable method of dealing with
overhauling the lingering remnants of an oppressive land regime.

156. Id.
157. Lobe, supra note 148.
158. TISCALI World Online, Mugabe Lashes Out at U.S., Britain, (Feb. 25,2003), available
at http://www.worldonline.co.za/news/newscenter_030225.584632.html (last visited July 9, 2003).
159. Id.
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